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I. Introduction
On October 23, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
finalized a groundbreaking rule, known as the Clean Power Plan, which
would reduce carbon emissions by focusing on pollution from power plants
and setting state-specific emissions goals. 1 The overall purpose of the rule
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is to decrease the United States’ CO 2 emission levels from the year 2005 by
thirty-two percent by 2030. 2 The regulation targets the electricity sector, an
industry that is responsible for emitting thirty-one percent of all CO 2
emissions in the United States. 3 As of this note, twenty-nine states have
mounted legal challenges against the regulation’s implementation on
federalism and statutory construction grounds, and the Supreme Court
recently issued a stay of the rule until the D.C. Circuit decides the merits of
these legal challenges. 4
The Clean Power Plan establishes national standards for CO 2
emissions under the auspices of section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, which
requires states to develop emission standards for pollutants emitted by
existing sources of pollution. The EPA contends that section 111(d) gives
the agency the authority to regulate power plants as existing sources of
pollution. 5 Thus, under the rule, states that have qualifying Electric
Generating Units (“EGUs”), or power plants, will be required to develop and
implement plans that set emission standards for these EGUs, or find other
ways of meeting the state-specific emissions targets. 6 In keeping with the
cooperative federalism approach found in environmental statutes like the
Clean Air Act, the Clean Power Plan allows states and power plants the
flexibility to decide how they will meet their emissions reductions goals.
The final rule specifies that the States of Alaska and Hawaii, as well as
the territories of Guam and Puerto Rico, do not have to comply with the
requirements of the rule because the “EPA does not possess all of the
information or analytical tools needed to quantify the BSER (Best System of
Emission Reduction).” 7 The State of Vermont and the District of Columbia
also do not have to comply with the requirements of the rule because these
areas do not house affected EGUs. The rule also acknowledges the burdens
that coal-country states will face in terms of job losses and posits that the
economic side effects that may result from the policy will be mitigated by

1. Clean Power Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64661 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
2. Id. at 64665.
3. Environmental Protection Agency, Sources of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/electricity
.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2015).
4. Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, Supreme Court Deals Blow to
Obama’s Efforts to Regulate Coal Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/02/10/us/politics/supreme-court-blocks-obama-epa-coalemissions-regulations.html.
5. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64663.
6. Id. at 64664.
7. Id.
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the POWER+ plan, a program that “addresses the important legacy costs in
coal country.” 8
Because Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the rule, and because
coal states will bear a significant burden under the regulation, one potential
legal defect of the Clean Power Rule is that it violates the Equal Sovereignty
Principle. 9 The doctrine served as the basis for invalidating the preclearance
formula in the Voting Rights Act. 10 According to Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion in Shelby v. Holder, the Equal Sovereignty Principle must be
factored in when assessing the “disparate treatment of states,” reasoning
that “the constitutional equality of the States is essential to the harmonious
operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.” 11
Accordingly, Chief Justice Roberts calls for a more stringent level of review
for federal government actions that treat states differently. 12
The Clean Power Plan may be inconsistent with the Equal Sovereignty
Principle because (1) the rule singles out states for disparate treatment in
two ways and (2) the EPA has an insufficient justification for the disparate
treatment in both instances. The rule singles out states for disparate
treatment by exempting the States of Alaska and Hawaii from compliance,
thus denying them of the benefits of the Clean Power Plan. The rule also
results in a disproportionate burden on coal-producing states because they
will have to expend significant resources to transition to a clean energy
economy while weakening existing domestic industries, a burden that other
states do not have to bear. Insufficient justification for disparate treatment
would violate the Equal Sovereignty Principle.
This Note argues that, because the Clean Power Plan provides a
benefit to the states in which it applies, the exemption singled out the
states to which it does not apply—Alaska and Hawaii—for disfavored
treatment, and the government did not have a compelling reason for doing
so. This results in the violation of the Equal Sovereignty Principle as
articulated in Shelby v. Holder.
This Note also contends that the
disproportionate burden facing coal-producing states under the rule does
not constitute disparate treatment, and accordingly, the Equal Sovereignty
Principle does not apply to this argument. Part I of this paper explores the
background and controversy behind the Clean Power Plan. Part II of this
Note analyzes the Equal Sovereignty Principle and discusses how courts
have treated Equal Sovereignty arguments. Part III explores a framework for
applying the Equal Sovereignty Principle. Part IV applies the analytical

8. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64670.
9. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013).
10. Id. at 2631.
11. Id. at 2623.
12. Id. at 2621.
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framework to the Clean Power Plan. Part V concludes the paper by
discussing the potential benefits of applying the Equal Sovereignty Principle
in the climate change context.

II. Background
The Clean Power Plan marks “the strongest action ever taken in the
United States to combat climate change.” 13 The plan sets uniform standards
for energy generating facilities: Natural gas plants have a performance target
of 771 pounds of carbon per megawatt-hour of power, while coal and oil
plants must meet a target of 1,305 pounds of carbon per megawatt-hour. 14
The rule also sets a particular state’s emissions target based on the
weighted aggregate of the rate goals outlined for the two types of power
plants. 15 For example, if a state has twenty-five power plants, and twentytwo of them are coal-fired plants (with the remainder of them being natural
gas plants), the state’s overall emissions goal would equal 1,242 pounds of
carbon per megawatt-hour. The state then has the flexibility to come up
with ways to meet its target—it could require the plants themselves to meet
their individualized emissions targets or the state could accomplish its
obligations by establishing a cap-and-trade program, join an existing capand-trade scheme, or enact renewable portfolio standards. 16 States are
obligated to submit a plan to the EPA detailing the course of action it has
selected to meet the standards. 17
The practical impact of the rule is that it will result in significant
reductions in the United States’ contribution to greenhouse gas emissions,
mirroring the steps that countries like China are taking to reduce their own
relative contributions. 18 However, in many states, the fossil fuel economy
continues to provide jobs that are perceived as crucial to the vitality of their
local economies. Thus, states have expressed deep concerns with the rule.
Attorney General Patrick Morrissey of West Virginia said in an interview: “We
think this regulation is terrible for the consumers of the state of West
Virginia. It’s going to lead to reduced jobs, higher electricity rates, and really
will put stress on the reliability of the power grid.” 19 Kentucky Energy and
13. Coral Davenport & Gardiner Harris, Obama to Unveil Tougher
Environmental Plan with His Legacy in Mind, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/us/obama-to-unveil-tougher-climate-plan-withhis-legacy-in-mind.html.
14. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64667.
15. Id. at 64674.
16. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64695–96.
17. Id. at 64697.
18. Id. at 64699.
19. Davenport & Harris, supra note 13.
250

West

Northwest, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2016

Environment Secretary Leonard Peters, commenting on the stricter targets
the state would have to meet compared to the draft rule, said that “if the
rule was a book, the draft would be a murder mystery and the final rule
would be a comedy.” 20
Accordingly, over two dozen states have filed suit to challenge the
validity of the rule. Opponents of the Clean Power Plan contend the rule is
legally vulnerable on a variety of constitutional and statutory interpretation
grounds. For example, they argue that section 111(d) does not give the EPA
the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions by mandating
reductions from regulated power plant sources. 21 Another example of a
statutory construction argument against the rule stems from the fact that
the rule requires states and electricity generating facilities to comply with a
new and complex regulatory scheme, requiring states to submit
implementation plans to the EPA similar to the Clean Air Act requirements
regarding State Implementation Plans (“SIPs”). Accordingly, the rule
imposes a statutory scheme that is just as onerous and cumbersome as the
organic statute itself, without additional congressional authorization. This
goes against the principle stated by Justice Scalia in Whitman v. American
Trucking: “Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of
a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one
might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” 22
There are also constitutional challenges to the Clean Power Plan on
the basis of the rule upsetting the horizontal separation of powers.
Professor Laurence Tribe argues that the rule violates the Tenth
Amendment. 23 As articulated in Printz v. United States, the Tenth Amendment
precludes the federal government from subverting the democratic process
and commandeering state governments by compelling them to implement
federal policies. 24 Professor Tribe argues that the Clean Power Plan
effectively allows the federal government to dictate a state’s energy mix,

20. Jean Chemnick and Emily Holden, Clean Power Plan Ratchets Up
Burdens on Coal States, E&E NEWS (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.eenews.net
/stories/1060023333.
21. David A. Zillberberg, EPA Issues Ambitious Clean Power Plan
Mandating Significant Reductions to GHG Emissions from the Power Industry by 2030,
15 PRATT’S ENERGY LAW REPORT 9 (LexisNexis A.S. Pratt).
22. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
23. EPA’S Proposed 111(d) Rule for Existing Power Plants: Legal and Cost
Issues: Hearing on the Clean Power Rule Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 16–23 (2015) (statement of
Laurence Tribe), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF03/20150317/103073/
HHRG-114-IF03-Wstate-TribeL-20150317-U1.pdf.
24. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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while imposing the costs of implementing its choice onto the states. 25
According to Professor Tribe, this arrangement impermissibly deprives the
citizens of the states the opportunity to hold the actual responsible parties
politically accountable. 26 Other constitutional law scholars contend that
this argument is not persuasive: The Clean Power Plan is modeled after
statutes such as the Clean Air Act, which give states the flexibility to decide
how to comply with federal standards, and have not been found to pose
constitutional problems. 27
However, another principle concerning the horizontal separation of
powers that has come up in recent case law, and may also be relevant to the
Clean Power Plan, is the Equal Sovereignty doctrine. 28 The principle served
as the basis for invalidating the preclearance formula in the Voting Rights
Act. 29 The Shelby County Court did not define the reaches of the Equal
Sovereignty Principle, and thus, the doctrine has the potential to serve as a
basis for striking down federal government actions in the future. Indeed, as
Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent in Shelby County, the decision “is
capable of much mischief.” 30 The Equal Sovereignty Principle may prove
particularly relevant in the climate change context, where certain states may
be saddled with regulatory burdens that others are exempt from by virtue of
their proximity to coastlines, or their relative contributions to the problem.

III. The Equal Sovereignty Principle
The Supreme Court largely rested its decision to strike down section 4
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 on the Equal Sovereignty Principle. 31 Up
until Shelby County, the concept of equal sovereignty, or the presumption of
equality among the states, was rarely invoked in case law. 32 In fact, in 1966,
when the Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to the Voting
Rights Act, the majority dismissed the argument that the federal

25. Tribe, supra note 23, at 19–23.
26. Id. at 22.
27. Richard Revesz, Obama’s Professor on Clean Power Plan—Wrong on
the Facts and Law, THE HILL (Dec. 9, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/
pundits-blog/energy-environment/226449-obamas-professor-on-clean-powerplan-wrong-on-facts-and.
28. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013).
29. Id. at 2631.
30. Id. at 2649.
31. James Blacksher & Lani Guinier, Free at Last: Rejecting Equal
Sovereignty and Restoring the Constitutional Right To Vote Shelby County v. Holder, 8
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 39, 44 (2014).
32. Id.
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government could not target specific states. 33 Thus, commentators fiercely
criticized the Shelby County decision for striking down a law of such import
based on a questionable legal hook. Judge Richard Posner, Chief Judge of
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote that equal sovereignty “is a
principle of constitutional law of which I had never heard—for the excellent
reason that . . . there is no such principle . . . [t]he opinion rests on air.” 34
David Gans of the Constitutional Accountability Center commented: “No
matter how many times one reads our Constitution, the simple fact is that
there is no ‘Equality of States Clause’ in it.” 35
Others argue that there “is indeed a deep structural principle of equal
sovereignty that runs through the Constitution.” 36 Thomas Colby argues that
the Equal Footing doctrine, which has been recognized by the courts,
necessarily implies the existence of the Equal Sovereignty Principle. 37 The
Equal Footing doctrine concerns the admission of new states to the union,
and whether they are admitted on the same terms as existing states. 38 The
Shelby County opinion cited, but did not analyze, three cases in support of its
invocation of Equal Sovereignty: Coyle v. Smith, United States v. Louisiana, and
Pollard v. Hagan, all of which are Equal Footing doctrine cases. 39 Colby, thus,
argues that the Equal Footing doctrine inheres the Equal Sovereignty
Principle because “Congress cannot admit a new state without making it the
sovereign equal of the other states.” 40
In order to analyze whether the Equal Sovereignty Principle applies,
and whether the principle would potentially affect the Clean Power Plan, it is
necessary to analyze cases in which courts have faced Equal Sovereignty
arguments. Equal Sovereignty arguments have been invoked in cases preand post-Shelby County with mixed results. In United States v. Ptasynski, the
Supreme Court faced the question of whether a federal statute that
exempted a particular state’s oil from a tax was valid. 41 In Nuclear Energy

33. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966).
34. Richard A. Posner, The Voting Rights Act Ruling Is About The
Conservative Imagination, SLATE (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_
court_2013/the_supreme_court_and_the_voting_rights_act_striking_down_t
he_law_is_all.html.
35. Thomas Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2016).
36. Id. at 4.
37. Id. at 15–17.
38. Id. at 15–16.
39. Id. at 19.
40. Id. at 17.
41. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1983).
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Institute, Inc. v. EPA (“NEI”), the D.C. Circuit Court considered Equal
Sovereignty claims in the environmental context. 42 Shelby County considered
the constitutionality of the preclearance formula in the Voting Rights Act,
which required some states to seek permission from the federal government
before making changes to their voting laws, and was the first case that struck
down a portion of a statute on Equal Sovereignty grounds. 43 In the Third
Circuit case of NCAA v. New Jersey, decided post-Shelby County, the court
considered the constitutionality of a federal law that banned the licensing of
sports betting in all but one state. 44 Together, these cases illustrate how the
doctrine may be applied in future instances.
A. United States v. Ptasynski
In Ptaskynski, the Court considered the constitutionality of a federal
statute to exempt oil produced in Alaska from the Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act. 45 The Act imposed an excise tax on oil producers, and the rate of
the tax was determined by the category of producer and type of oil
produced. 46 The Act exempted oil owned by governments and charities,
Alaskan oil, oil produced on Native American lands, and “front-end” oil, from
the tax. 47 The plaintiffs, largely domestic oil producers and the States of
Louisiana and Texas, contended that the Alaskan Oil exemption violated the
Uniformity Clause of the Constitution, which requires taxes to be uniform
throughout the United States. 48
The district court invalided the Act on the grounds that the statute
impermissibly drew distinctions based on geographic boundaries. 49 The
Supreme Court reversed, rejecting this Equal Sovereignty-type argument. 50
In doing so, the Court noted that Alaska’s exemption from the tax “reflects
Congress’ considered judgment that unique climatic and geographic
conditions require that oil produced from this exempt area be treated as a
separate class of oil.” 51 The Court also pointed out that drilling wells in
Alaska costs more than in other parts of the United States, thus, justifying

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
254

Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013).
NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 224 (3d Cir. N.J. 2013).
United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 75–76 (1983).
Id. at 77–78.
Id.
Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549, 550 (D. Wyo. 1982).
Id. at 553.
Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 80.
Id. at 79.
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the exemption. 52 The Court concluded that Alaskan oil “merited favorable
treatment.” 53 This case may also illustrate that private parties, not just
states, have the ability to raise Equal Sovereignty-type arguments. Thus,
this case can serve as a guide in instances where private parties are harmed
by the inapplicability of a law or policy in a particular state.
B. Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. Environmental Protection
Agency (“NEI”)
In NEI, the plaintiffs challenged the federal government’s decision to
designate Yucca Mountain in Nevada as a national nuclear waste repository
site. 54 Congress decided to locate the waste at Yucca Mountain after it
abandoned the lengthy and time-consuming process detailed in the
National Waste Policy Act for selecting sites to store nuclear waste. 55
Congress amended the original law by requiring the government to focus
exclusively on Yucca Mountain. 56 Because the law was not facially neutral,
the petitioners contended, it violated the Tenth Amendment and “principles
of federalism ostensibly inherent in the Constitution as a whole.” 57 The
plaintiffs contended that the law violated the Constitution’s “equal
treatment” requirement because it imposed unique burdens on the state of
Nevada. 58 The plaintiffs argued that while there is no direct textual basis
supporting the concept of equal treatment of the states, the concept is
implied from the existence of the Guarantee Clause, the Port Preference
Clause, the Uniformity Clause, the Bill of Attainder Clause, and the Equal
Footing doctrine. 59
The NEI court rejected the petitioner’s Tenth Amendment and equal
treatment arguments on several grounds.
In rejecting the Tenth
Amendment claim, the court heavily factored in the fact that Yucca
Mountain was federal property, and that under the Property Clause,
Congress has plenary power over federal lands. 60 Additionally, the law did
not regulate the state’s activities, but only circumscribed the state’s ability

52. Id.
53. Id. at 86.
54. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
55. Id. at 1260.
56. Id. at 1260–61.
57. Id. at 1305.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1308 (“We fail to see, moreover, how the constraints
demanded by Nevada’s claim would be consistent with the plenary nature of
Congress’s Property Clause authority.”).
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to use Yucca Mountain for another purpose. 61 The court also held that
because the national political process did not operate in a defective manner
when Congress chose to designate Yucca Mountain as the national waste
repository, the Tenth Amendment was not implicated. 62 In rejecting the
petitioner’s equal treatment argument, the court simply stated that the
“novel” concept “has no textual basis in the Constitution.” 63
C. Shelby County v. Holder
At issue in Shelby County was the constitutionality of the Voting Rights
Act. 64 The Act requires that certain states and counties, determined by a
coverage formula, would have to seek prior approval from the Department of
Justice before making changes to local election laws. 65 Nine southern states
were largely singled out by the preclearance formula, which applied to
jurisdictions that historically employed a voter suppression device such as a
literacy test or poll tax. 66 Shelby County, Alabama, a covered jurisdiction
under the Act, sought an injunction against the enforcement of the law and
a declaratory judgment that the coverage formula was facially
unconstitutional. 67
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Shelby County asserted that there is a
“fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the states,” and that the
principle is relevant to assessing federal government action that treats
states differently. 68 Accordingly, the opinion articulated the standard that
should apply to laws in this context. “A departure from the fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate
geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” 69
Thus, the federal government must have a sufficient justification for treating
states differently.
The opinion alludes to the idea that the Act’s departure from the Equal
Sovereignty Principle may have been necessary at the time it was enacted in
order to address pervasive racial discrimination that Black communities
faced in attempting to exercise the franchise. 70 However, given the recent

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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Id. at 1305.
Id.
Id. at 1306.
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013).
Id. at 2623.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329 (1966).
Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622.
Id. at 2624.
Id. at 2627.
Id. at 2618.
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trends suggesting that Blacks and Whites in covered jurisdictions were
approaching parity, and even exceeding the rates of participation and
registration in noncovered jurisdictions, the majority in Shelby County
contended that the conditions giving rise to the extraordinary expansion of
federal power were no longer present. 71
The opinion, however,
acknowledged that discrimination in voting still takes place. Thus, in spite
of the continued existence of the problems that the statute attempts to
address, the Court held that there was not a sufficient justification for the
disparate treatment of the states based on the original coverage formula. 72
This suggests that federal government must clear a significantly high bar
when treating states differently, rather than simply requiring a rational
relationship between the problems and the statute’s means to address
them.
The opinion further describes the mechanics of the Act, and how they
serve to create disparities amongst the states. 73 For example, the Act
requires covered jurisdictions to go through the lengthy and timeconsuming preclearance process, whereas uncovered jurisdictions that may
have worse voting outcomes, are not subject to the onerous requirements
outlined by the Act. 74 Accordingly, it may be surmised that the Court was
troubled that the problems sought to be addressed in the Act were present
in uncovered jurisdictions, yet went unregulated under the statute because
the preclearance formula did not adapt to changing conditions.
Therefore, under the Equal Sovereignty Principle as articulated in
Shelby County, the Court is suspicious of federal action that treats states
differently without having a sufficient justification because it upsets the
relationship between the federal government and the states. Thus, statutes
that allow states to slip by unregulated under a scheme where the problems
addressed in the regulation are occurring may be constitutionally
problematic.
D. NCAA v. New Jersey
The Third Circuit considered Equal Sovereignty arguments post Shelby
County in NCAA v. New Jersey. 75 The State of New Jersey attempted to license
gambling on professional and amateur sports. 76 The plaintiffs argued that
New Jersey’s decision violated the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (“PASPA”), which made the licensing of sports betting illegal

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 2625.
Id.
Id. at 2624.
Id.
NCAA v. N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 214.
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in most states. 77 New Jersey argued that PASPA was unconstitutional on
Equal Sovereignty grounds because it permits Nevada to license widespread
sports gambling while banning other states from the activity. 78
The Third Circuit’s analysis of the Equal Sovereignty Principle first
required it to ascertain whether the law was permissible under the
Commerce Clause. 79 After concluding that PASPA regulates an activity that
has substantial effects on interstate commerce, and is therefore valid, the
court rejected New Jersey’s Equal Sovereignty argument. 80 The court rested
its decision on the fact that in Shelby County, the Voting Rights Act was
enacted pursuant to Congress’s power under the post-Civil War
Amendments, rather than the Commerce Clause:
Indeed, while the guarantee of uniformity in treatment amongst the
states cabins some of Congress’ powers, see, e.g., U.S. Const., art. I., § 8, cl. 1
(requiring uniformity in duties and imposts); id. § 9, cl. 6 (requiring
uniformity in regulation of state ports), no such guarantee limits the
Commerce Clause. 81
The court expressed concern that a one-size-fits-all approach for laws
enacted under the Commerce Clause would severely circumscribe
Congress’s power. 82 The court also noted that even if the Equal Sovereignty
Principle applied to legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause,
PASPA would still pass muster because the law served to single out a
Nevada for favorable treatment, which was unlike the case in Shelby County,
where the Voting Rights Act singled out states for disfavored treatment. 83
Furthermore, the court noted that New Jersey’s invocation of the Equal
Sovereignty Principle to invalidate PASPA altogether was inappropriate: “[I]f
PASPA’s preferential treatment of Nevada violates the equal-sovereignty
doctrine, the solution is not to strike down only that exemption. The
remedy New Jersey seeks—a complete invalidation of PASPA—does far
more violence to the statute, and would be a particularly odd result.” 84

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
258

Id.
Id.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 225–26.
Id. at 238.
Id.
Id. at 239.
Id.
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IV. The Equal Sovereignty Framework
Given the infrequent invocation of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, it is
unclear what, exactly, an Equal Sovereignty analysis entails. The seminal
Equal Sovereignty case, Shelby County, provides little guidance on how the
doctrine could be applied in future instances. Thomas Colby argues that in
NCAA v. New Jersey, the Third Circuit’s treatment of the Equal Sovereignty
claim post-Shelby County was akin to the court throwing its hands up in the
air. 85 However, looking closely at the aforementioned cases, the outcomes
are reconcilable. The cases reveal that the essential aspects of the doctrine
include: 1) whether the law calls for disparate treatment of the states; 2)
whether the issue at hand raises concerns regarding the vertical balance of
power by regulating in an area traditionally performed by states; and 3)
whether there is sufficient justification for the disparate treatment.
The first step in the Equal Sovereignty analysis is whether the law at
issue treats states differently. The Shelby County Court specified that the
principle is operative any time there is disparate treatment of the states,
while the Third Circuit suggested that an Equal Sovereignty analysis is
limited to instances where the disparate treatment resulted in unfavorable
treatment for one or more states, as was the case in Shelby County. The
totality of the aforementioned Equal Sovereignty cases suggest that Equal
Sovereignty issues arise when one or more states are specifically benefited
or burdened in a regime, rather than when the impact of a facially neutral
regime happens to disproportionately fall on one or more states.
Disparate treatment was present in every equal sovereignty case. For
example, in Ptasynski, the statute named Alaska as a recipient of the oil tax
exemption, rather than basing the exemption on a set of neutral criteria,
such as the cost of drilling exceeding the national average by some
amount. 86 In NEI, Yucca Mountain in Nevada was the site statutorily
designated for nuclear waste without any consideration of other sites. 87 In
Shelby County, however, the use of the preclearance formula may indicate
disparate impact rather than disparate treatment because of a formula’s
perceived neutrality, but it was clear that the Shelby County Court viewed the
formula’s unchanging nature as de facto disparate treatment: The formula
would always result in the application of the preclearance requirement to
the same states without Congress amending the formula. 88 Hence, if there is

85. Colby, supra note 35, at 4.
86. Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549, 551 (D. Wyo. 1982).
87. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1260-61 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
88. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2615 (2013) (“Coverage
still turned on whether a jurisdiction had a voting test in the 1960s or 1970s,
and had low voter registration or turnout at that time.”).
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only a disparate impact on the states rather than the presence of treatment,
there are likely no Equal Sovereignty concerns.
However, if disparate treatment is present, the next step in the
analysis is to determine whether the disparate treatment raises concerns
regarding the vertical separation of powers. In NEI, Congress’s regulation of
nuclear waste likely did not raise a federalism problem because it was an
issue of national concern, thus making it an appropriate subject for
congressional action. Similarly, in Ptasynski and NCAA, the taxing of
domestic oil producers in response to international oil markets and the
regulation of gambling did not arouse suspicion of federal aggrandizement.
In contrast, in Shelby County, the Court noted that decisions regarding voting
were traditionally a province of state governments, thus federal regulation in
this area raised concerns regarding the balance of power between federal
and state government.
The cases also illustrate that an integral part of the balance of power
analysis takes into consideration whether the law or regulation represents a
valid exercise of power. 89 For example, in NEI, Congress was properly acting
pursuant to its broad powers under the Property Clause by choosing to
designate Yucca Mountain as the nuclear waste repository site: Yucca
Mountain is federal property. 90 In NCAA, Congress was exercising its power
to regulate interstate commerce, and in Ptasynski, Congress was acting under
its taxing power. 91 Thus, when the Constitution allots broad powers to a
branch of government and it is acting in furtherance of that broad grant of
power, the balance of power problem is not implicated.
The last step of the analysis, as articulated in Shelby County, is whether
the federal government has sufficient justification for the disparate
treatment and also that it is sufficiently related to the problem that it
targets. In Shelby County, the Court struck down the preclearance formula
because there was an insufficient basis to continue using it to impose
onerous requirements on covered jurisdictions. 92 It was important that the
condition sought to be regulated by the Voting Rights Act—
disenfranchisement of Black communities—was present (or may have been
worse) in uncovered jurisdictions. 93 In contrast, in Ptasynski, the Court cited
the costs of drilling oil in Alaska, as compared to other domestic sources of
oil, as a sufficient justification for exempting oil producers in that state from
the windfall profits tax since the high price of oil would risk oil production

89. NCAA v. N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 224 (3d Cir. 2013) (analyzing the
Commerce Clause claim before addressing the Equal Sovereignty issue).
90. NEI, 373 F.3d at 1308.
91. NCAA, 730 F.3d at 225-26; Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 80.
92. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
93. Id. at 2622.
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there and therefore would result in a loss of tax revenues. 94 Thus, the
exemption, which served as the basis for disparate treatment, was found to
be justified by the local conditions. In Shelby County, there were insufficient
differences between covered and uncovered jurisdictions to justify the
difference in treatment.

V. Applying the Equal Sovereignty Doctrine to the Clean
Power Rule
Using the framework discussed above, in order to evaluate whether the
Clean Power Rule violates the Equal Sovereignty Principle, we must first
ascertain whether the principle applies. If the regulation treats states
differently in some respect, the doctrine is applicable. If, on the other hand,
there is only the presence of disparate impact rather than disparate
treatment, the Equal Sovereignty Principle does not apply. Next, if disparate
treatment is present, the question is whether there are balance of power
concerns with the federal regulation of the subject at hand. If the subject of
regulation does not concern the vertical balance of power, the regulation
would pass muster under the Equal Sovereignty Principle. However, if the
regulation concerns an area that has traditionally been under the purview of
states, we must next examine whether there is a sufficient justification for
the disparate treatment. If there are insufficient differences between the
regulated and unregulated jurisdictions with respect to the target problem
at hand, the justification is insufficient, and the Clean Power Rule would
violate the Equal Sovereignty Principle.
A. Whether the Equal Sovereignty Principle Applies
The threshold question is whether the Equal Sovereignty Principle
applies. As the Third Circuit indicated, there may be certain limitations on
when the doctrine applies in a given context. 95 As discussed previously, the
Equal Sovereignty Principle may not apply to circumstances where there is a
disparate impact of a facially neutral law or policy; doing so would severely
circumscribe congressional power, which the Third Circuit noted was a
concern in a broader application of the Equal Sovereignty Principle. 96
Here, in challenging the Clean Power Rule, opponents could argue that
the rule results in disparate treatment for two reasons. First, the Clean
Power Rule specifically exempts Alaska and Hawaii even though the states
have qualifying EGUs under the rule. Alaska and Hawaii did not qualify for
an exemption on the basis of neutral criteria that would have been available
to other states if they simply harbored specific traits that would serve as the
94.
95.
96.

Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 79.
NCAA, 730 F.3d at 239.
Id. at 238.
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grounds for an exemption. Rather, the states were specifically named, akin
to the circumstances in NEI and Ptasynski. Therefore, the exemption
constitutes disparate treatment, and the Equal Sovereignty Principle applies
to this claim.
Second, opponents to the rule may also use the burden borne by the
coal states as evidence of disparate treatment. The rule itself acknowledges
that it is likely to result in more onerous burdens for states that depend on
coal as compared to other states. 97 Thus, they may contend that it is
analogous to the scheme in Shelby County where the majority opinion
characterized the coverage formula as disparate treatment, even though the
formula did not specifically name the states the formula applied to. This
argument, however, is unpersuasive. In Shelby County, the coverage formula
was based on conditions that were operative on or before a specified year,
so a state could never escape the preclearance requirement, regardless of
what steps or measures were taken subsequently to address the problem of
disenfranchisement. In contrast, in the Clean Power Plan, a state’s status is
dependent on the number of fossil fuel burning power plants within the
state, so a state could theoretically escape the regulatory burden by taking
remedial action. The rule calls for determining a state’s GHG emissions
target based on the number and type of energy plants located within the
state; states with more EGUs may face more regulatory burdens than states
with fewer EGUs. Consequently, the Equal Sovereignty Principle likely does
not apply to this argument.
Under the Third Circuit’s jurisprudence, the Equal Sovereignty
Principle seemingly only applies when one or more states have been singled
out for unfavorable treatment. This limiting principle may make the doctrine
easier to apply and may be useful for courts in considering Equal
Sovereignty claims. Here, if only unfavorable treatment is sufficient to
invoke the application of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, proponents of the
exemption would argue that it constitutes favorable treatment for Alaska
and Hawaii, and thus, the Equal Sovereignty Principle does not apply here
as well.
From a traditional federalism analysis, it may be the case that
regulation, generally, constitutes disfavored treatment, and a lack of
regulation
constitutes
favorable
treatment.
However,
the
favorable/unfavorable analysis could be construed more broadly: If we
consider the benefits a state receives from a particular regulatory scheme, the
deprivation of these benefits could, actually, constitute disfavored treatment.
This conception is warranted under the Equal Sovereignty Principle because it
seemingly arises from a distinct legal premise, rather than from the Commerce

97. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64670 (discussing the
POWER+ plan to help coal states grapple with changes to their economy as
a result of the rule).
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Clause or the Tenth Amendment, where the favorable/unfavorable analysis
takes for granted that the presence of regulation is a per se burden on the state.
With regards to the Clean Power Rule, research suggests that there are
significant benefits associated with its implementation. 98 David E. Adelman
and David B. Spence contend that the benefits of the Clean Power Plan
would exceed the costs of the regulation, and that the benefits of reducing
emissions under the rule would be predominantly felt locally. 99 Several
studies support the conclusion that coal plants are responsible for more
damage to public health and the environment than any other industrial
source. 100 Opponents of the exemption could argue that, because the
exemption would result in preventing the people of Alaska and Hawaii from
experiencing the benefits of the Clean Power Plan, the lack of regulation
constitutes unfavorable treatment. 101 Therefore, even under a requirement
that the Equal Sovereignty Principle only applies to disfavored treatment,
the Equal Sovereignty Principle should apply in this context.
B. Whether There Are Federalism Concerns
Because the state exemptions likely constitute disparate treatment,
and the treatment can be characterized as unfavorable, the next question is
whether the subject of the regulation indicates that there may be balance of
power issues. If the subject of the federal regulation has traditionally been
under the purview of state governments, this is more likely to raise
federalism concerns, as was the case in Shelby County and voting decisions.
Here, there are plausible arguments on both sides concerning the
Clean Power Plan. Proponents of the existing rule can argue that, because
the regulation is modeled after the Clean Air Act which has been found to
pass constitutional muster, the Clean Power Rule’s cooperative federalism
approach also does not raise constitutional concerns. Additionally,
proponents of the existing rule may argue that carbon pollution raises an
issue of international significance, which makes the issue appropriate for
the federal government to address. The recent Conference of the Parties
meeting in Paris illustrates the global consequences of domestic efforts to
reduce emissions: each country’s commitment to curtail its emissions has
been meticulously documented, and the international community has

98. David E. Adelman & David B. Spence, Cost-Benefit Politics in U.S. Energy
(Aug. 11, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2642459.
99. Id. at 23.
100. Id.
101. Suzanna Caldwell, Fairbanks Air Quality a Dirty Shame Locals Call
a Community Health Crisis, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.
adn.com/article/fairbanks-air-quality-dirty-shame-locals-call-community-hea
lth-crisis.
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reached an agreement on a framework for addressing climate change. 102
Proponents could argue the Clean Power Plan does not upset the balance of
state and federal power because the issue of climate change is inherently an
international one where the U.S. must speak with one voice on the world
stage. Therefore, they could argue that executive action on this subject is in
accords with the international dimension of the issue of climate change.
However, opponents of the rule have a compelling argument that the
subject of regulation does, indeed, touch an area that is traditionally under
state purview. Professor Laurence Tribe argues that the rule “impermissibly
trenches on State authority over intrastate energy regulation.” 103 This
argument rests on significant legal precedent. The Supreme Court has
recognized that energy production and energy choices are decisions for state
governments to make. 104 Even federal statutes recognize the states’
authority in this arena: under the Federal Power Act, the regulation of
intrastate electricity is the exclusive province of the states. 105
Here, opponents of the rule may argue that the Clean Power Plan is
designed to compel the states to make cleaner energy choices, and serves as
an end run around established precedent developed under the Commerce
Clause in the field of energy law. This is because the rule arguably limits
states’ authority to regulate its energy sector or make decisions about its
energy choices, an area that has been recognized as a subject of state
regulation. Therefore, the Clean Power Rule likely raises federalism
concerns akin to the voting regulations in Shelby County.
C. Whether There Is Sufficient Justification for the Disparate
Treatment
Because the Clean Power Rule results in disparate treatment, and
likely raises federalism concerns by regulating in an area traditionally left to
the states, the next inquiry is whether there is sufficient justification for
exempting Alaska and Hawaii from the Clean Power Rule. Shelby County
suggested that this inquiry is demanding, requiring more than just a rational
basis for the disparate treatment. 106 The final rule states: “Because the EPA

102. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the
Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCC/CP/2015/L.9 (Dec. 12, 2015).
103. Tribe, supra note 23, at 19.
104. PG & E v. State Energy Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 224 (1983)
(“States traditionally have possessed the authority to choose which
technologies to rely on in meeting their energy needs.”).
105. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a).
106. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 (2013) (“a
departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a
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does not possess all of the information or analytical tools needed to
quantify the BSER for the two non-contiguous states with otherwise affected
EGUs (Alaska and Hawaii) . . . [the] emission guidelines do not apply to
those areas.” 107
The rule further explains that setting targets for
noncontiguous states would not be appropriate because they are
geographically isolated. 108 Thus, the two justifications for the disparate
treatment is the EPA’s lack of information to set emissions targets and the
states’ geographic isolation. The question therefore becomes whether these
two justifications are sufficiently related to the problem that the regulation
targets: climate change. 109
With regard to the first justification given by the EPA, it must be noted
that the EPA did, in fact, initially issue emissions target for the State of
Alaska. 110 An Alaska air quality official expressed that the exemption came
as a surprise. 111 The decision to exempt the State of Alaska was lauded by
the utilities industry in the state, and some have suggested that the EPA was
influenced by the potential costs facing the state as a result of the plan,
even though other states that are covered under the rule expressed similar
concerns. 112 Indeed, Alaska’s political leadership lobbied for an exemption
from the rule, 113 and was reportedly given assurances from EPA
Administrator Gina McCarthy emission standards are unlikely to be imposed
on Alaska. 114 Hence, the fact that the EPA set targets for the state but later

showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related
to the problem that it targets.”).
107. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64664.
108. Id. at 64826.
109. Id. at 64664 (“This rule establishes, at the same time, the
foundation for longer term GHG emission reduction strategies necessary to
address climate change and, in so doing, confirms the international
leadership of the U.S. in the global effort to address climate change.”).
110. Memorandum from Norman Rokeburg, Regulatory Comm. of
Alaska, to Senator Cathy Geisel (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_
documents.asp?docid=3479.
111. Elwood Brehmer, Utilities, Leaders Welcome Exemption From Emissions
Rule, ALASKA JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.alaskajournal.
com/business-and-finance/2015-08-06/utilities-leaders-welcome-exemption-emis
sions-rule#.VnwO7d-rRE4.
112. Id.
113. Erica Martinson, Murkowski Urges EPA To Drop Alaska From
Climate Change Rule, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.adn.com/
article/20150429/murkowski-urges-epa-drop-alaska-climate-change-rule.
114. Power Plan Hub, E&E NEWS, http://www.eenews.net/
interactive/clean_power_plan/states/alaska (last visited Dec. 22, 2015).
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withdrew it as a result of intense lobbying indicates that the justification of
a lack of information is unlikely to withstand intense review. 115
The second justification for the exemption is that Alaska and Hawaii
are geographically isolated. 116 In justifying the decision to not set emissions
targets for these states, the EPA cited Massachusetts v. EPA for the proposition
that “the Courts have recognized the authority of agencies to develop
regulatory programs in step-by-step fashion.” 117 However, this argument is
also unpersuasive, and likely would not clear the test articulated in Shelby
County, which requires a showing that the difference in treatment of the
states is related to the problem the regulation is targeting. 118
Because the goal of the regulation is to address climate change, the
only valid reason for exempting states from the Clean Power Plan would be
on the basis of those states not contributing to the problem of emissions
from qualifying EGUs. Here, Alaska and Hawaii do have qualifying EGUs but
were exempt from the regulation nonetheless. While the States of Alaska
and Hawaii are isolated from the continental United States, climate change,
however, is not a geographically isolated phenomenon: the greenhouse gas
emissions contributing to the problem of climate change are present in
Alaska and Hawaii, but the regulation still leaves them out. The effect of the
exemption here is analogous to the circumstance in Shelby County that was
found to raise an Equal Sovereignty problem: the problem exists in the
unregulated jurisdictions as well, but only the regulated jurisdictions bear
the burden of the Clean Power Plan. Interestingly, the rule repeatedly
acknowledges how Alaska in particular is facing challenges attributed to
climate change. 119 It is particularly problematic to exclude the state from the
Clean Power Plan, effectively depriving the residents of the state from
experiencing the localized benefits associated with the rule’s
implementation where the need is clearly acute.
The EPA’s citation of Massachusetts v. EPA to justify not extending
emissions targets to these states is also problematic. The Court explained
there that a step-by-step approach justifies incremental actions to alleviate
climate change. However, this statement does not justify a violation of the

115. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64671.
116. Id. at 64825.
117. Id. at 64826.
118. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2627 (2013).
119. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64683 (“Climate change
may also exacerbate ongoing environmental pressures in certain
settlements, particularly in Alaskan indigenous communities.”); id. at 64685
(“Particularly in Alaska, critical infrastructure and traditional livelihoods are
threatened by climate change.”); id. at 64687 (In Alaska, temperatures have
changed faster than anywhere else in the U.S.”).
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Equal Sovereignty Principle. Every step that the federal government takes to
alleviate climate change can be taken in a manner that maintains the
integrity of the Equal Sovereignty Principle. The incremental step approach
endorsed in Massachusetts v. EPA was meant to address the challenge of
solving climate change across all states over time, rather than trying to solve
the problem on a state-by-state basis. 120 Thus, the EPA’s citation to the case
to justify the exemption was erroneous. The disparate treatment, therefore,
is not sufficiently justified.
To remedy this Equal Sovereignty problem, the EPA need only include
Alaska and Hawaii in the rule. This approach is consistent with the idea
raised in the NCAA case, which mentioned that the best way to remedy an
Equal Sovereignty problem may be to nullify the exemption, rather than
striking the rule down altogether.

VI. Conclusion
Although there are two bases to argue that the states are being treated
under the Clean Power Plan, only the argument that the exempted state is
experiencing disfavored treatment is a candidate for the application of the
Equal Sovereignty Principle. The government must have a sufficient
justification for the disparate treatment. Here, given that the government
did seek to include Alaska in rule and only exempted the state at the very
last stages of the rulemaking process, and did not articulate a compelling
reason for this policy change, the rule is likely unconstitutional under the
Equal Sovereignty Principle. The application of the Equal Sovereignty
Principle would allow Alaska and Hawaii to realize the localized benefits of
the Clean Power Plan while helping to decrease the United States’
contribution to global emissions.
Unless the Supreme Court articulates a limiting principle to the
doctrine of Equal Sovereignty, environmentalists should be aware of the
significance of the doctrine due to the impacts of climate change. Climate
change will more than likely necessitate Congress to pass laws to deal with
problems that require nuance and may be state-specific. The fact that laws
or regulations in the future must have a sufficient justification for disparate
treatment may be incompatible with the practical aspects of how legislation
is passed, so it is important that laws are written in more neutral terms.
The Equal Sovereignty Principle could both be used to strike down
laws that are important to environmentalists, or it could be used to increase
the reach of environmentally protective statutes by preventing states from
receiving exemptions from obligations, which are not sufficiently justified.
This is important because every ton of CO2 emissions could prove critical in
stemming the impact of climate change. Furthermore, this principle could
120. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457 (2007)
(discussing redressability arguments).
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help ensure that all states have responsibilities to combat climate change,
instead of leaving the most vulnerable states to shoulder the burden.
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